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THE COURT AND THE CODE:
A RESPONSE TO THE WARP AND WOOF OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
LAWRENCE ZELENAK†
Most tax lawyers (myself included) believe there are features of
the Internal Revenue Code that distinguish the art of interpreting the
code from the interpretation of most other statutes. It is gratifying
that the thoughtful and thorough work of Professors James J.
1
Brudney and Corey Ditslear tends to support that belief, both
descriptively and normatively. Strictly speaking, Professors Brudney
and Ditslear establish only that interpreting the code is a different
exercise from interpreting federal workplace statutes, but most tax
lawyers would be willing to assume (on perhaps too little evidence)
that the interpretation of workplace statutes is in the interpretive
mainstream and that code interpretation is the outlier. In this brief
Response, I offer a few observations—admittedly, somewhat
scattershot—on some of the questions considered by Professors
Brudney and Ditslear. My comments focus on the role of tax
legislative history in the interpretive process, the usefulness (or lack
thereof) of tax-specific canons of statutory interpretation, the ability
of Supreme Court Justices without extensive pre-judicial tax
backgrounds to write high-quality opinions in tax cases, and the
limitations of quantitative analysis of judicial opinions.
I. QUESTIONING THE EXPERTISE-BORROWING EXPLANATION OF
THE COURT’S USE OF TAX LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
I agree with Professors Brudney and Ditslear that the quality of
the committee reports on federal tax legislation—in terms of both
process and product—is extremely high and that Justice Scalia’s
arguments for disregarding legislative history are, therefore,
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particularly weak in the tax context. I am not sure, however, that I
fully agree with Professors Brudney and Ditslear’s expertiseborrowing description of how the Supreme Court uses the reports of
3
the tax writing committees. My sense is that even the most expert tax
lawyers lean very heavily on committee reports in attempting to
understand tax legislation, and that they do so not because the tax
expertise of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation is
necessarily greater than their own, but because they know it is
standard congressional practice to use the committee reports to
resolve statutory ambiguities and to fill in statutory gaps. (The old
tax-lawyer joke, that one should consult the statute only if the
4
legislative history is unclear, is not entirely a joke.) Even the most
expert of tax lawyers consult tax legislative history to determine
legislative intent, and one would expect even the Justices with the
greatest tax expertise to do the same for the same reason. Professors
Brudney and Ditslear show that Justice Blackmun, with his unique
tax background among his contemporaries on the Court, relied on tax
5
legislative history only slightly less than his colleagues. This lends
some support to my view; if using legislative history were primarily
about expertise borrowing, Justice Blackmun presumably would have
leaned much less heavily than the other Justices on tax writing
committee reports.
II. TAX-SPECIFIC SUBSTANTIVE CANONS OF
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
Professors Brudney and Ditslear suggest that the Court’s use of
tax-specific substantive canons of interpretation can be understood as
6
a form of expertise borrowing and that Justice Blackmun’s tendency
to invoke such canons much less than the other Justices can be
7
explained by his greater tax expertise. That may be right, but I would

2. See id. at 1276–95.
3. See id. at 1277.
4. RICHARD SCHMALBECK & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 32
(2d ed. 2007).
5. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1275 tbl.9.
6. Id. at 1277.
7. Id. at 1301. But see Indopco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79, 84 (1992). In Justice
Blackmun’s opinion for the Court, a substantive canon plays a crucial role: “In exploring the
relationship between deductions and capital expenditures, this Court has noted the ‘familiar
rule’ that ‘an income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of clearly
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suggest another possibility—that such canons tend to be worthless or
worse, and that Justice Blackmun appreciated that fact more often
than the other Justices. The objection to the canons—which will come
8
as no surprise to fans of Karl Llewellyn —is that canons often exist on
opposite sides of the same question and that there is no policy
justification for either of the competing canons. Compare, for
example, the invocation in one Supreme Court tax opinion of “the
9
principle disfavoring implied tax exemptions,” with the Court’s claim
in another tax opinion that tax statutes “are construed most strongly
10
against the government, and in favor of the taxpayer.” Professor
Boris Bittker, probably the greatest legal scholar in the history of the
federal income tax, had little use for either canon: “[I]t is far from
clear why the Code should be construed strictly against either the
11
taxpayer or the government.”
III. WRITING HIGH-QUALITY TAX OPINIONS ON THE SUPREME
COURT: PRE-JUDICIAL TAX EXPERTISE PREFERRED,
BUT NOT REQUIRED
Professors Brudney and Ditslear show that Justice Blackmun
authored considerably more majority opinions in tax cases than any
12
of his colleagues. They also suggest, and I agree, that his tax
13
opinions are generally of high quality. Several of his opinions—
showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer.’” Id. (quoting Interstate Transit
Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)).
8. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950).
9. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 356 (1988), quoted in Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1268.
10. Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151, 153 (1917). Admittedly, Gould v. Gould is a bit long in
the tooth, but it continues to have adherents on the federal courts. See, e.g., Sec. Bank Minn. v.
Comm’r, 994 F.2d 432, 441 (8th Cir. 1993), nonacq. 1996-1 I.R.B. 6.
11. BORIS I. BITTKER, MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE ZELENAK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF INDIVIDUALS ¶ 1.03[1], at 1–25 (3d ed. 2002).
12. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1270.
13. See id. at 1273. I do have two quibbles, however. First, the fact that Justice Blackmun
wrote seventeen dissents in tax cases (compared with thirty-four majority opinions) indicates
that his views on tax cases were not overwhelmingly influential with his colleagues. See Brudney
& Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1272 (dissents); id. at 1271 tbl.8 (majority opinions). Second, on
occasion Justice Blackmun’s views in tax cases could be quite idiosyncratic. For example, in his
dissent in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), Justice Blackmun
argued for overturning the decades-old tax benefit rule (under which the occurrence of an event
inconsistent with a deduction claimed in an earlier year requires an income inclusion in the year
in which the inconsistent event occurs) in favor of a new approach (under which the occurrence
of a later inconsistent event would require amending the return for the year in which the
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INDOPCO, Inc. v.
including Commissioner v. Tufts,
15
16
Commissioner, and Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States —
are landmarks in Supreme Court tax jurisprudence. In an insightful
qualitative analysis of Justice Blackmun’s tax opinions, Professor
Robert A. Green commented, “Many of Justice Blackmun’s tax
17
opinions are legendary among tax lawyers and academics.”
Professor Green described Justice Blackmun’s multifaceted approach
to interpreting the code:
Justice Blackmun’s [tax] opinions . . . exemplif[y] a practical
reasoning approach to statutory interpretation. . . . This approach
does not rely exclusively on any single touchstone for interpretation.
Rather, it relies on multiple arguments that draw on a broad range
of evidence and considerations: the statutory text, legislative history,
legislative purpose, post-enactment developments (including judicial
and administrative precedents), and the practical consequences of
18
alternative interpretations.

Although Justice Blackmun’s strong tax background helps
explain the quantity and quality of his tax opinions—much as, a
generation earlier, Justice Jackson’s tax career influenced his
19
Supreme Court tax opinions —it is noteworthy that Justices Marshall
and O’Connor, without having extensive tax backgrounds, were able
to write tax opinions held in similarly high regard by tax lawyers and
academics. Neither wrote nearly as many tax opinions as Justice
20
Blackmun, but my sense is that the average quality of their tax
opinions is as high as that of Justice Blackmun’s, and there is some
anecdotal evidence to suggest that my sense is widely shared. For
example, Professor Stephen B. Cohen has opined that “[d]uring his
deduction was claimed), id. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). As Justice O’Connor noted in her
majority opinion, “[N]one of the parties has suggested such a result, no doubt because the rule is
so settled.” Id. at 380 (majority opinion).
14. Comm’r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
15. Indopco, Inc. v. Comm’r, 503 U.S. 79 (1992).
16. Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546 (1993).
17. Robert A. Green, Justice Blackmun’s Federal Tax Jurisprudence, 26 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 109, 110 (1998).
18. Id. at 130.
19. See Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L.
REV. 171, 172–73 (2001).
20. See Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1271 tbl.8 (showing that Justice Blackmun
authored thirty-four majority opinions in tax cases to Justice Marshall’s eighteen, and that
Justice O’Connor was not among the four justices writing the highest percentage of majority
opinions in tax cases during their tenures on the Court).
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twenty-four years on the Supreme Court, Justice Marshall wrote
better opinions on federal income taxation than any of his fellow
21
In an article reviewing Justice O’Connor’s tax
justices.”
jurisprudence, Professor Myron C. Grauer has identified Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor as the three Justices of recent
decades who “have become known for authoring opinions in
22
significant tax cases.” Professor Grauer described Justice O’Connor
as possessing “a sophisticated understanding of the structure of our
tax system” and “a faculty for explaining the development of an
23
aspect of tax law in clear, almost hornbook-like prose.” Although
the tax accomplishments of Justices Marshall and O’Connor take
nothing away from Justice Blackmun’s accomplishments in the same
field, it is interesting and gratifying to note that Justices without
extensive pre-judicial tax backgrounds can write tax opinions that are
highly regarded by tax experts. Tax law is undeniably complex, but
Justices Marshall and O’Connor have demonstrated that it is not
beyond the capacity of generalist judges and Justices to write
thoughtful and sophisticated opinions in tax cases.
IV. A ROLE FOR QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
A great virtue of Professors Brudney and Ditslear’s primarily
quantitative analysis of Supreme Court tax opinions is that it reveals
trends and approaches that are easily missed under the tax lawyer’s
usual qualitative approach to judicial opinions. On the other hand,
qualitative approaches are superior to quantitative analysis in some
respects (as I am sure Professors Brudney and Ditslear would readily
agree). In particular, a quantitative approach may fail to identify a
case of special significance, instead treating it as merely one of many
data points.

21. Stephen B. Cohen, Thurgood Marshall: Tax Lawyer, 80 GEO. L.J. 2011, 2011 (1992).
Highlights of Justice Marshall’s tax jurisprudence include Cottage Savings Ass’n v.
Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991); Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner, 485 U.S. 212 (1988);
and United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
22. Myron C. Grauer, Justice O’Connor’s Approach to Tax Cases: Could She Have Led the
Court Toward a More Collaborative Role for the Judiciary in the Development of Tax Law?, 39
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 69, 70 (2007).
23. Id. at 71. Highlights of Justice O’Connor’s tax jurisprudence include her majority
opinion in Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983); her concurrence in
Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (O’Connor, J., concurring); and her dissent in
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 704 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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As an example, Professors Brudney and Ditslear’s study does not
mention what seems to me the most interesting and important story
in Supreme Court tax jurisprudence in the past decade. In the 2001
24
case of Gitlitz v. Commissioner, the Court reached an extremely
taxpayer-favorable result in a case involving the interaction between
the rules governing cancellations of indebtedness and the rules
governing shareholder basis in the stock of S corporations. In an
opinion written by Justice Thomas for an eight-member majority, the
25
Court adopted a literal interpretation of the statutory language,
producing a structurally absurd tax benefit (the deduction of a tax
loss not corresponding to any actual economic loss) clearly not
contemplated by Congress. Justice Thomas needed just one sentence
to dispose of the argument that Congress did not intend to confer
such a benefit: “Because the Code’s plain text permits the taxpayers
here to receive these benefits, we need not address this policy
26
concern.”
Gitlitz was not a tax-shelter case; it was a case in which the
taxpayer happened to stumble into an unreasonably favorable result
not contemplated by Congress rather than a case in which the
taxpayer planned a transaction to exploit a literal reading of the code
at odds with legislative intent. Nevertheless, the Court must have
been aware that the lower courts were being deluged with tax-shelter
cases and that taxpayers would win most or all of those cases under
Gitlitz’s literal interpretive approach The aggressive marketing of tax
shelters combined with Gitlitz-style interpretation posed a threat to
27
the fisc of the highest order. Observers concerned about the
integrity of the federal tax structure awaited developments with
trepidation. Much to their surprise (or at least to my surprise), the
Gitlitz dog has never barked again in the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has cited Gitlitz in no subsequent opinions, the Court
has not granted certiorari in any tax-shelter cases, and in the lower
courts the government has won almost all of its tax-shelter cases since

24. Gitlitz v. Comm’r, 531 U.S. 206 (2001).
25. Id. at 218.
26. Id. at 220.
27. See, e.g., Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters: The Problem,
Possible Solutions, and a Reply to Professor Weisbach, 55 TAX L. REV. 325, 351 (2002) (“There
was no tax shelter [in Gitlitz], in that the taxpayer did not look for a gap and then plan to take
advantage of it. Nevertheless, this language in Gitlitz could indicate a more general view of the
Court that taxpayers are free to take advantage of the Code as they find it.”).
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2005. Perhaps the Court’s quiet retreat from the brink should be
labeled a nonstory rather than a story, but if so it is by far the most
important Supreme Court tax nonstory of this decade. It is not a
story, however, that is likely to be uncovered by a quantitative study.
V. WHO THINKS TAX CASES ARE NOT INTERESTING, AND WHY?
Professors Brudney and Ditslear note the widespread view
29
among the Supreme Court Justices that tax cases are boring.
Whether or not Supreme Court tax cases are interesting is not a
question that Professors Brudney and Ditslear investigate (sensibly
enough), but I cannot resist taking this opportunity to comment on
the topic. Although the view of tax cases as boring must be nearly
universal among people who are not tax specialists, I suspect it is
generally assumed that tax specialists have a different view. I hereby
reveal a tax lawyers’ secret: we also think that most Supreme Court
tax cases are boring these days. Unlike many of the workplace
statutes, the Court’s interpretation of which Professors Brudney and
Ditslear also investigate, the Internal Revenue Code is a mature
statute (despite Congress’s never-ending tinkering). With rare
exception, the big interpretive issues were decided decades ago, and
what is left for the Court today are just some mundane interstitial
questions. Tax lawyers do not think old Supreme Court tax cases are
boring, and they do not think legislative and regulatory developments
are boring, but they largely agree with the Court that the tax cases it
considers today are less than riveting. To say that Supreme Court tax
cases are dull is not, however, to say that tax law is dull. To borrow
and adapt Norma Desmond’s famous remark in Sunset Boulevard: tax
law is still big; it’s the cases that got small.

28. See, e.g., Kornman & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 527 F.3d 443, 453 (5th Cir. 2008);
Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749, 753 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
131 (2008); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d 220, 231 (2d Cir. 2006); Coltec Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 454 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1261 (2007);
Black & Decker Corp. v. United States, 436 F.3d 431, 443 (4th Cir. 2006); Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 435 F.3d 594, 605 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1251 (2007); Long Term
Capital Holdings, LP v. United States, 150 F. App’x 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2005). The government has
suffered one significant loss in this timeframe, in Sala v. United States, 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167,
1167 (D. Colo. 2008), but reversal on appeal seems likely.
29. Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 1, at 1272–73 (“Some of the Justices likely deferred to
Justice Blackmun simply because they were not interested in tax law—something Blackmun
recognized inside the Court as well as in public statements.”).

